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USING RIVAL EFFECTS TO IDENTIFY SYNERGIES 




The strategy literature has found it difficult to differentiate between collusive and efficiency-
based synergies in horizontal merger activity. We propose a theoretically-backed methodological 
approach to classify mergers that yields more information on merger types and merger effects, 
and that can, moreover, distinguish between mergers characterized largely by collusion-based 
synergies and mergers characterized largely by efficiency-based synergies. Crucial to the 
proposed measurement approach is that it encompasses the impact of merger events not only on 
merging firms (custom in the literature), but also on non-merging rival firms (novel in the 
literature). Employing the event-study procedure with stock-market data on samples of large 
horizontal mergers drawn from the US and UK (an Anglo-American sub-sample) and from the 
European continent, we demonstrate how the proposed schematic can better clarify the nature of 
merger activity. 
 
Key words:  acquisitions, event-study, mergers, research methods, rivals, synergy 
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Introduction 
A vast amount of strategy literature has employed the event-study procedure (combined with 
either stock price or accounting data to capture profitability) to examine merger and acquisition 
(M&A) performance – see the extensive reviews by Datta et al. (1992), King et al. (2004), and 
Haleblian et al. (2009). This research has yielded a number of different insights concerning the 
merits of merger activity; e.g., M&As generally benefit target firms but represent break-even 
propositions for acquirer firms. Research has also yielded insights concerning the drivers of 
M&A performance; e.g., mergers that involve related firms (Rumelt, 1974; Palepu, 1985; 
Prahalad and Bettis, 1986; Singh and Montgomery, 1987; Flanagan, 1996), integration processes 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Pablo, 1994; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999), and acquirer 
experience (Hitt et al., 2001; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001; Barkema and Schijven, 2008) are 
potentially more likely to improve performance. A consistent assumption throughout the 
literature is that a successful – or synergistic – M&A is one that generates enhanced profitability 
for merging firms: i.e., the combined acquirer and target (Barney, 1988; Datta, 1991; Lubatkin, 
1987). Accordingly, synergistic mergers are simply those mergers that lead to a net gain (e.g., in 
profitability) for merging firms (Michel and Shaked, 1985; Weidenbaum and Vogt, 1987). 
 
Yet, a number of scholars (e.g., Chatterjee and Lubatkin, 1990; Lubatkin, 1983; McGahan and 
Porter, 1999; Seth, 1990) have noted that two broad synergy types exist: collusive synergies 
(based on the market-power implications of reduced competition where prices and profits go up 
for all firms in a market) and efficiency-based synergies (based on a broader set of micro-
foundations including the operational, managerial, financial and resource-sharing opportunities 
involved with merging two firms). Efficiency-based synergies accordingly refer to more than just Using Rival Effects  2 
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simple  cost-reductions,  but  also  to  synergies  resulting  from  combining  the  resources  and 
capabilities  of  merging firms.  While Walter and Barney  (1990) point out  that  collusion  and 
efficiency  represent  the  principal  rationales  behind  horizontal  M&As,  the  researcher  cannot 
distinguish  between  these  different  synergy  types  when  strictly  considering  merging  firm 
profitability.  Namely,  a  positive  profit  effect  for  merging  firms  identifies  the  presence  of 
synergies but cannot indicate whether these synergies are largely collusive or efficiency based. 
 
The  inability  to  separate  synergy  types  led,  for  instance,  to  Chatterjee  (1986)  dropping  all 
horizontal M&As from  his  study in  order to  eliminate the effect  of  collusive synergies  and 
concentrate on efficiency-based synergies. While such a tactic makes sense when non-horizontal 
mergers involve minimal market power, there are instances when non-horizontal M&As actually 
involve collusive elements: e.g., foreclosure of downstream competitors or increasing upstream 
collusive conduct (Nocke and White, 2007; Normann, 2009; Ordover et al., 1990). Moreover, the 
tactic to drop horizontal activity is even more drastic in that many horizontal M&As clearly 
involve  efficiency-based  synergies.  Even  more  troubling  is  the  trend  in  organizational 
scholarship – noticed and empirically refuted by Oxley, Sampson and Silverman (2009) – to 
completely neglect collusive synergies as a relevant and vital outcome of merger activity—see 
also McGahan and Porter (1999) for evidence in support of collusive effects. The proclivity of 
scholarship to either omit horizontal merger activity from study or neglect the potential role of 
collusive synergies is partly due to the inability to differentiate between horizontal mergers that 
are largely efficiency or collusion based. 
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Our  aim  is  to  propose  a  theory-based  means  to  classify  M&A  activity  that  yields  more 
information  on  actual  merger  types;  thus,  our  contribution  involves  the  advancement  of 
measurement procedures. In particular, we provide a methodological approach for future strategy 
research to more finely delineate between different merger types. Fundamental to our proposed 
methodological approach is the necessity to consider the impact of merger transactions on both 
merging  firms  (custom  in  the  literature)  and  non-merging  rival  firms  (not  custom  in  the 
literature).  Accordingly,  we  extend  and  improve  upon  the  traditional  measurement  approach 
where researchers simply consider value changes in merging firms in order to determine the 
nature  of  merger  activity  (e.g.,  Lubatkin,  1987;  Cannella  and  Hambrick,  1993;  Lubatkin, 
Srinivasan and Merchant, 1997). We do this  by taking into account  structural  insights  from 
industrial organization (IO) theory regarding the impact of strategic actions on the profitability 
and value of competitor firms, and by enhancing the crude conceptualizations in IO concerning 
efficiency with richer theories from strategic management. In this vein, McWilliams, Soegel and 
Teoh (1999) observe (and are concerned in their empirical context) that merger events can affect 
competitor firms—see Oxley et al. (2009) for an assessment of how rare it is in the management 
literature for researchers to examine rival effects.
1 Moreover, by simultaneously considering the 
profit effects of M&A transactions on both  merging and rival firms, we are able to show that 
collusion-based synergies (where rivals gain from the merger event) are fundamentally different 
from  efficiency-based  synergies  (where  rivals  are  harmed  by  the  merger  event).  Thus  by 
employing our proposed approach to consider both merging  firms and non-merging rival firms, 
the researcher can distinguish between mergers  that are largely collusive and mergers that are 
largely efficiency-based. In short, considering rival effects  – in combination with the strategy Using Rival Effects  5 
literature‘s traditional focus on acquirer and target profitability – yields critical information on 
the types of mergers being proposed.  
 
Beyond the heuristic benefits of generating a means for future research to better distinguish 
between  different  merger  types,  our  proposed  schematic  responds  to  additional  calls  in  the 
organizational literature. First, Ketchen, Boyd and Bergh (2008: 646) note that ―researchers … 
[have] … struggled with operationalizing the attributes of competitive advantage‖. In this vein, 
we  follow  up  on  Hitt  et  al.‘s  (2001:  58)  pinpointing  of  what  distinguishes  efficiency-based 
synergy – ―creation of synergy results in a competitive advantage for the firm‖ – by factoring 
into our schematic the only location where competitive advantage can be detected: rival effects. 
Second, we  respond  to  Chatterjee‘s  (1986)  early  call to  build an  analysis encompassing  the 
impact of M&As on both merging and rival firms. Chatterjee (1992: 269) noted the potential for 
a schematic when he surmised that ―if we simultaneously consider the stock price reactions of 
the rival and [merging firms] then we can uniquely determine the capital market‘s expectations 
about  the  …  takeover‖.  Thus  the  seeds  –  efficiency-based  synergies  generate  a  competitive 
advantage, and the relevance of considering rival effects – of such an identification scheme have 
been present in the literature for some time, but have yet to be developed into a full-fledged 
methodological framework to measure the nature of merger activity. 
 
In order to support our main aim – provide a measurement procedure that factors the impact of 
horizontal mergers on both merging and rival firms in order to improve our understanding of 
M&A  activity  –  we  structure  the  remainder  of  the  paper  as  follows.  First,  we  discuss  the 
methodological,  conceptual  and  theoretical  foundations  behind  our  proposed  measurement Using Rival Effects  6 
approach. Second, we lay out the merger schematic by presenting a taxonomy of four merger 
types.  Third,  we  demonstrate  the  relevance  of  the  schematic  by  formulating  a  theoretical 
hypothesis, operationalizing the taxonomy, outlining the employed data and reviewing the event 
study procedure. Fourth, we present the empirical results. Fifth, we discuss the implications of 
the proposed schematic for the strategy literature. 
 
Methodological and Theoretical Foundations 
In proposing a methodological approach that yields more information on the nature of merger 
activity, we improve upon the empirically-driven approach that has often been employed in the 
strategy  literature  by  proposing  a  theoretically-driven  approach  that  more  finely  delineates 
merger type. The pre-existing literature would generally focus on how a merger impacts the 
value and profitability (whether that be measured by stock-price effects, accounting data, or 
other measures) of merging firms (e.g., Lubatkin, 1987; Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Lubatkin 
et al., 1997). Accordingly, a value-enhancing (or synergistic) merger would be indicated by a 
positive profit effect on merging firms, while a value-decreasing merger would be indicated by a 
negative  profit  effect  on  merging  firms  (Michel  and  Shaked,  1985;  Weidenbaum  and  Vogt, 
1987).  While  many  studies  would  treat  the  profit-effect  on  merging  firms  as  a  continuous 
variable, Table 1 illustrates the simple taxonomy that was generally employed to characterize the 
nature of merger activity. 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------- Using Rival Effects  7 
We  attempt  to  improve  upon  this  simple  empirically-based  methodological  framework  for 
detecting merger type by adopting basic insights from the theory of industrial organization (IO) 
and  enhancing  these  spartan  IO  theoretical  models  with  richer  insights  from  strategic 
management  theory.  The  IO  field‘s  primary  focus  is  the  nature  of  competition  (prices  and 
quantities)  in  imperfectly  competitive  markets—markets  that  exhibit  a  finite  number  of 
competitors, rivalry, and, most importantly, strategic interaction between firms (Tirole, 1992). 
Moreover, strategic interaction between firms in imperfectly competitive markets suggests direct 
links between the actions of one firm and the ultimate profitability of competitor firms (Porter, 
1985). Interdependence forces firms to adapt their market strategies when competitor firms take 
strategic actions (Chen, 1996), and has direct implications with regard to identifying the two 
main merger types we focus on here: collusion-based and efficiency-based synergistic mergers. 
 
While relatively rich modeling tools have been employed to factor the nature of competition and 
strategic  interaction,  efficiency  effects  in  IO  models  have  still  largely  been  represented  by 
simplistic  marginal  cost  reductions.  Furthermore,  the  IO  literature  essentially  ‗black  boxes‘ 
efficiency effects by not analyzing in depth the source of these efficiency gains. It is in this realm 
where  integrating  the  IO  framework  with  the  strategic  management  literature  is  particularly 
useful  in  improving  the  theoretical  underpinnings  of  our  proposed  merger  schematic.  In 
particular, the simplistic IO idea that efficiency-based gains derive strictly from cost reductions 
can  be  understood  as  a  reduced  form  specification  that  actually  results  from  more  complex 
processes: e.g., via the combination and integration of firm specific resources and capabilities 
(Barney, 1986; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Peteraf, 1993)—see Boone, 2006 for a rare example of 
IO  theoretical  work  influenced  by  strategy  insights  regarding  resource  accessing.  While Using Rival Effects  8 
motivating the existence of efficiency-based synergies with more complex managerial theories, 
we can still use the straightforward logic of IO models to elicit the nature of horizontal mergers: 
i.e., efficiency-based synergies, being merger specific, increase the profitability of merging firms 
but  decrease  the  profitability  of  rival  firms  (Farrell  and  Shapiro,  1990).  Put  differently, 
efficiency-based synergistic mergers exert a negative externality on rival firm profitability. 
 
The IO framework also incorporates the presence of collusion-based synergistic mergers. The 
change in market structure brought about by a merger forces all firms in a market to re-optimize 
market strategies. Given the reduced rivalry due to the presence of fewer competitors, higher 
prices and profits result due to a contraction in aggregate output (Salant et al., 1983; Denekere 
and Davidson, 1985; Perry and Porter, 1985; and Farrell and Shapiro, 1990). Following in this 
tradition, Gimeno and Woo (1999) empirically support fewer competitors generally leading to 
higher prices and profits for all firms in a market. One can even further specify the dynamics 
involved with collusive mergers under the two stock models in IO of imperfect competition: 
strategic competition over quantities (Cournot), and strategic competition over prices (Bertrand). 
In particular, merging firms reduce production and rivals increase production – though to a lesser 
degree than the merging firms‘ reduction – when quantity is the strategic variable—see Zhang 
and Gimeno (2010) for a representation of this dynamic. Further when price is the strategic 
variable, merging firms raise prices (or equivalently contract production) and rivals – to a lesser 
degree – raise prices (or equivalently contract production). In short, collusion-based mergers 
enhance the profits of both merging firms and rival firms by altering the market structure and 
eliciting accommodating responses by all firms in the market. Put differently, collusion-based 
synergistic mergers exert a positive externality on rival firm profitability. Using Rival Effects  9 
 
While the opening passages and above discussion indicate that rival effects can help differentiate 
between  the  two  M&A  types  which  are  profitable  for  merging  firms  (collusion-based  and 
efficiency-based synergistic mergers),  un-profitable mergers can  also  be explained in  such a 
theoretical framework. As is abundantly clear from the prescriptive literature advising firms not 
to engage in acquisition activity (e.g., Lubatkin et al., 1997; Lubatkin and Lane, 1996; Sirower, 
1997), many M&As result in merging firms experiencing losses: i.e., negative profit effects for 
merging firms, as represented by ‗value-decreasing‘ mergers in Table 1. As Bergh (1997) notes, 
many value-decreasing mergers ultimately lead to divestitures and a damaged reputation for the 
acquiring firm and its managers. A number of explanations for the existence of such mergers 
have  been  posited:  e.g.,  empire-building  –  managerial  incentives  to  grow  the  company  at 
shareholder expense (Mueller, 1969; Walsh, 1988; Weidenbaum and Vogt, 1987); managerial-
hubris – managerial expectations are systematically upward biased (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; 
Roll, 1986); as well as information processing constraints in the Simon (1957) tradition, and 
internal political games in the Pettigrew (1977) tradition.
 While it is well understood that targets 
reap the majority of M&A gains while acquirers usually break-even but often experience value 
losses  (Andrade  et  al.,  2001;  King  et  al.,  2004),  the  existence  of  value-decreasing  mergers 
highlights the fact that acquirer value losses are sometimes so substantial that the net effect on 
the merging firms represents a loss (i.e., acquirer losses outweigh any potential target gains).  
 
We can also break down these value-decreasing mergers into two types: non-synergistic (where 
merging firms lose but rivals gain) and value-destroying (where both merging firms and rivals 
lose).  Moreover,  both  of  these  merger  types  can  be  nested  within  an  enhanced  IO-based Using Rival Effects  10 
theoretical  framework.  With regard to  non-synergistic mergers, Amir  et  al.  (2009) present  a 
formal theoretical treatment for these merger types by introducing uncertainty into a standard 
merger model. Thus, if the expected merger-based synergies do not manifest; then a merger 
which ex-ante seems to be profitable might in the end be unprofitable. Moreover, the value-
decreasing nature of such mergers creates competitive opportunities for enhancing rival firm 
profitability  and  performance  (Amir  et  al.,  2009;  Ghemawat  and  Ghadar,  2000).  Recent 
scholarship has begun to shed more light on value-destroying mergers, as these merger types 
have been traditionally difficult to explain. Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005) consider cases where 
a merger involves substantial efficiencies (thus rival firm profitability suffers due to the negative 
externality);  yet, the merger also involves substantial integration costs due to the challenges 
involved  with  integrating  fundamentally  different  corporate  cultures  (Buono  and  Bowditch, 
1989; Cartwright and Cooper, 1993; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). Thus, value-destroying 
mergers (where mergers are unprofitable for both merging and rival firms) can manifest in an 
enhanced  version  of  the  basic  IO  model  that  encompass  endogenous  merger  decisions 
(Fridolfsson and Stennek, 2005). 
 
In  sum,  basic  insights  from  the  theory  of  industrial  organization  rest  behind  our  proffered 
methodological schematic for delineating the nature of merger activity. Further, we can improve 
upon the crude conceptualization of efficiencies in IO theory by embracing richer theories from 
strategic management on leveraging the resources and capabilities of two merged firms in order 
to create competitive advantage. Drawing from these different disciplinary traditions forms a 
robust theoretical framework with stronger conceptual foundations that allows more confidence 
in  generating  a  merger  schematic  that  advances  measurement  procedures  regarding  merger Using Rival Effects  11 
activity.  Accordingly,  our  theoretically-backed  methodological  approach  to  simultaneously 
factor the impact of a merger on the profits of merging and rival firms provides better insight on 
the true nature of merger activity.  
 
Taxonomy of Merger Activity 
In order to fully factor how mergers impact the profitability of merging firms and non-merging 
rivals,  it  helps  to  now  build  our  taxonomy.  While  the  preceding  discussion  outlining  the 
methodological  foundations  (the  pre-existing  empirical  approach  in  strategy  research  to 
measuring merger performance and categorizing merger activity) and theoretical foundations (IO 
theory  enriched  with  strategic  management  theory)  sets  the  basis  for  our  proposed 
methodological  approach,  the  presentation  of  the  four  merger  types  is  essential  in  order  to 
illuminate our schematic of merger outcomes. Table 2 illustrates the proposed taxonomy of four 
merger types with respect to their varied effects on merging and rival firms. 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------- 
First, a long-standing rationale behind horizontal mergers is the elimination of competitors and 
facilitation of collusion amongst remaining firms (e.g., Porter, 1985; Stigler, 1964). The core 
dynamic behind these mergers is that the actions by merger insiders to increase prices and/or 
reduce output push the overall prices in the market up to the benefit of rivals. Hence, collusive 
transactions are beneficial to merger insiders (acquirers and targets) and outsiders (rivals), but 
come at the expense of suppliers and customers. Here, merging firms and rivals are competitive 
complements:  the  competition  reduction  leads  to  increased  market  power  which  enhances Using Rival Effects  12 
merging and rival firms‘ profits. As an aside, the collusive elements of horizontal mergers were 
considered by many scholars (e.g., Chatterjee and Lubatkin, 1990; Lubatkin, 1983; Seth, 1990) 
to be a unique synergy source (along with operational) for related mergers and, thus, one of the 
reasons why related mergers may outperform unrelated mergers. Accordingly, mergers falling in 
the northwest quadrant of Table 2 (where both merging and rival firms gain) can be considered 
collusion-based synergistic mergers. 
 
The $50 billion combination of Total-Fina and Elf-Aquitaine in 1999 is a good example of a 
collusion-based synergistic merger, as the transaction eliminated direct competition between two 
large French petroleum companies. The merger yielded profit gains for both the merging firms 
and their rivals, as competition was significantly reduced in a number of markets. In fact, the 
European Commission (EC) opposed the merger due to anti-competitive concerns, yet French 
authorities supported the merger on national-champion grounds (Dinc and Erel, 2010). While the 
EC  was  able to  force TotalFina to  undertake adjustments by divesting seventy  retail  outlets 
where  competition  would  be  substantially  hindered  due  to  significant  overlap,  TotalFina 
attempted  to  skirt  such  minimal  remedies  by  selling  these  retail  assets  to  a  non-petroleum 
company that would not pose significant competition (Monti, 2003). Please see the Appendix for 
this and additional examples of collusion-based synergistic mergers. 
 
Second, the most widely cited rationale behind horizontal mergers is the search for efficiency-
based synergies that can be pursued via scale and scope economies, as well as via skill and 
resource sharing between merging firms (Walter and Barney, 1990). Accordingly, M&As that 
reduce costs for merging firms by any metric – scope, scale, or buyer-power – are synergistic Using Rival Effects  13 
mergers. Based on the work conceptualizing industries as being characterized by a degree of 
resource heterogeneity and immobility (Barney, 1991), management research has moved beyond 
a focus  on  cost-based synergies to  embrace a  richer  consideration of synergies with  M&As 
representing a means to purchase resources that could not otherwise be accessed (Barney, 1986; 
Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Peteraf, 1993). More specifically, acquisitions provide bidders with 
new products, assets and skills which may be used to serve both new and pre-existing customers. 
For instance, Capron (1999) considers how resource redeployment post-acquisition can enhance 
M&A performance. In this vein, Hitt et al. (2001: 82) argue that the joining of ―complementary 
resources between an acquiring and acquired firm can create synergies that, in turn, generate a 
competitive  advantage  for  the  firm  over  its  competitors‖.  As  they  infer,  efficiency-based 
synergistic mergers are fundamentally different to collusion-based synergistic mergers in that 
rivals indicate negative – not positive – profit-effects for such mergers. With efficiency-based 
synergistic mergers, rival firms and merging firms represent competitive substitutes: the M&A 
involves the joining of resources and capabilities that gives merging firms an advantage vis-à-vis 
rivals, thus the M&A represents a competitive threat to rivals. Accordingly, mergers falling in 
the southwest quadrant of Table 2 (where merging firms gain, but rivals lose) can be considered 
efficiency-based synergistic mergers. 
 
Boeing‘s  1997  acquisition  of  McDonnell  Douglas  (MD)  represents  a  good  example  of  an 
efficiency-based  synergistic  merger,  as  this  combination  of  resources  and  complementary 
product lines yielded a competitive advantage for Boeing vis-à-vis rival firms. In particular, the 
joining of Boeing‘s extensive fleet of commercial aircraft with MD‘s commercial and defense 
industry assets reportedly led to a marked strengthening in Boeing‘s competitiveness (Haid and Using Rival Effects  14 
Hornschild, 1997). The threat this merger posed to Airbus – Boeing‘s chief rival – eventually led 
to a substantial amount of opposition to the merger from European officials (Hill, 2011: 302-
307); though, European objections were eventually moderated. Please see the Appendix for this 
and additional examples of efficiency-based synergistic mergers. 
 
Third, some value-decreasing mergers which harm the profitability of merging firms can actually 
enhance  the  profitability  of  rival  firms.  In  particular,  when  firms  compete  as  competitive 
substitutes, value-decreasing mergers represent an opportunity for non-merging rivals. The M&A 
does not involve sufficient joining of resources and capabilities, thus the merged firm has no 
advantage  vis-à-vis  rival  firms.  In  fact,  the  internal  integration  challenges  of  such  a  merger 
(Birkinshaw et al., 2000;  Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Larsson and Lubatkin, 2001) could 
encumber the firm in strategic competition – recall that managerial time and cognition come in 
limited quantities – to the advantage of rivals. In this vein, Ghemawat and Ghadar (2000) point 
out that many astute rival firms take advantage of competitors hindered with substantial merger 
integration processes by seizing the opportunity to launch aggressive marketing campaigns or 
other  bold  strategic  moves.  These  types  of  mergers  are  the  reciprocal  of  efficiency-based 
synergistic mergers: just as a merger which enhances efficiency will threaten rivals, a merger 
which decreases the efficiency (or competitiveness) of merging firms represents a competitive 
boon to rivals. Accordingly, mergers falling in the northeast quadrant of Table 2 (where merging 
firms lose, but rivals gain) can be considered non-synergistic mergers. 
 
The  joining  of  AOL  and  Time-Warner  in  1999  represents  the  epitome  of  a  non-synergistic 
merger, as this $360 billion transaction has been widely viewed as one of the most significant Using Rival Effects  15 
M&A failures of modern times (Quinn, 2009). The merger involved substantial challenges that 
led  to  –  even  controlling  for  the  burst  in  the  dot-com  bubble  –  substantial  decreases  in 
profitability  for  the  merging  parties,  as  the  integration  of  media  content  and  delivery  never 
yielded  actual  efficiencies  and  synergies  (Quittner,  2009).  Furthermore,  the  substantial 
integration challenges – and lack of synergies – provided a competitive advantage in strategic 
competition to more traditional media companies (e.g., Vivendi, CBS and Viacom) that did not 
attempt to create some type of ‗new media‘ vertical conglomerate. Please see the Appendix for 
this and additional examples of non-synergistic mergers. 
 
Fourth, some value-decreasing mergers actually generate competitive losses for both merging 
and  rival  firms.  In  this  class  of  M&As,  the  merging  and  rival  firms  can  be  considered 
competitive complements; i.e., the merger is value-decreasing for both merger insiders (acquirer 
and target) and outsiders (rivals). As already noted, these types of mergers are characterized by 
high integration costs (Buono and Bowditch, 1989; Cartwright and Cooper, 1993; Haspeslagh 
and Jemison, 1991) that actually exceed the synergistic benefits for merging firms, and by rival 
firms that suffer due to the presence of efficiencies and synergies. Furthermore, recent literature 
on the nature of defensive merger activity (e.g., Akdogu, 2003; Brito, 2003; Fridolfsson and 
Stennek, 2005; Molnar, 2007) helps shed light on the dynamics behind a subset of these value-
destroying mergers: pre-emptive mergers. In particular, if losing a target to a competitor means 
you would experience a substantial profit loss, then it may make sense to engage in a merger that 
decreases the future profit stream for merging firms when this decreased profit stream is less 
than  the  decreased  profit  stream  of  being  an  outsider  to  the  merger.  Hence,  some  value-
destroying mergers might mitigate the profit losses of merging firms; thus, merging firms pre-Using Rival Effects  16 
empt  an  even  worse  situation.
2  Thus,  we  categorize  M&As  that  generate  net -negative 
profitability changes for merging and rival firms as  value-destroying mergers, and we further 
note that a sub-set of these mergers can be categorized as pre -emptive mergers. Accordingly, 
mergers falling in the southeast quadrant of Table 2 (where merging and rival firms lose) can be 
considered value-destroying mergers. 
 
American Telephone & Telegraph‘s (ATT) expansion and vertical integration into the computer 
industry via the acquisition of NCR Corporation in 1990 represents a good example of a value-
destroying merger. While the complementary financial and technical resources that ATT could 
leverage onto NCR certainly made the competitive life of NCR‘s rivals more difficult (Network 
World,  1990),  ATT  was  unable  to  fully  take  advantage  of  the  acquisition  and  enhance 
profitability  due  to  unfamiliarity  with  this  non-core  industry  and  the  reluctance  of  ATT 
communication service competitors to make purchases from an ATT subsidiary. As ATT stated 
to its shareholders, the ―advantages of vertical integration [which had motivated ATT‘s earlier 
acquisition of NCR] are outweighed by its costs and disadvantages‖.
3 With regard to the pre-
emptive mergers‘ sub-category (where rival firm losses outweigh merging firm losses) within 
value-destroying mergers, Kimberly-Clark‘s acquisition of Scott Paper in 1995 represents a good 
example.  This  merger  resulted  in  a  loss  for  the  shareholders  of  the  two  merging  firms,  but 
yielded  even  greater  losses  to  rival  firms  not  participating  in  this  consolidation  within  the 
declining paper goods industry (Davies and Lyons, 2007). Please see the Appendix for these and 
additional examples of value-destroying mergers. 
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The above discussion shows how variations in the impact of transactions on merging and rival 
firms‘  profitability  can  provide  an  indication  of  a  merger‘s  true  nature.  However,  it  bears 
pointing out that specific mergers will potentially involve elements of different merger types: 
e.g., many M&As involve both efficiency-based and collusion-based elements (Kim and Singal, 
1993). Yet, the profit effect indicates which element dominates: the net effect. For example, an 
M&A where merging firms elicit positive profitability effects may involve both collusive and 
efficiency-based synergies, yet if rivals elicit a negative profit effect then the efficiency-based 
elements of the transaction dominate the collusive elements. For instance, the efficiency-based 
Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas pairing noted above also surely involved some collusive effects due 
to  the  reduction  in  competition;  however,  the  efficiency-effects  involved  with  the  merger 
evidently swamped the collusive-effects. Likewise, if rivals elicit a positive profit effect then the 
collusive elements of the transaction dominate the efficiency-based elements. Accordingly, our 
schematic provides a direct means – factoring rival and merging firm effects – to disentangle 
mergers that are ‗dominantly‘ collusion-based from mergers that are ‗dominantly‘ efficiency-
based mergers, and to disentangle value-destroying mergers from non-synergistic mergers.  It 
should be pointed out that our ‗net effect‘ is also appropriate in a temporal sense. For instance, a 
merger between two competitors may be efficiency-based (e.g., rivals suffer) in the short-run, 
but collusive (e.g., rivals gain) in the long-run; thus, the overall profit effect on rival firms will 
indicate which temporal effect dominates—a ‗net present value‘ so to speak.  
 
Empirical Demonstration 
Theoretical Question Using Rival Effects  18 
Our express purpose is to propose a theory-based methodological approach to classifying M&A 
activity that yields more information on actual merger type; thus, formal testing of hypotheses 
related to what determines merger outcomes does not represent our main aim. Nevertheless, we 
can  build  a  simple  hypothesis  concerning  cross-national  heterogeneity  in  institutional  and 
corporate governance practices and how that heterogeneity might impact the nature of merger 
activity in different geographical contexts. It should be underscored, however, that the ambition 
is  not  to  contribute  to  the  literature  on  the  relevance  of  macro-level  factors  –  e.g.,  national 
culture, legalistic and institutional traditions – in understanding organizational outcomes, but 
instead to set the proper theoretical motivation for empirical tests that might demonstrate the 
relevance  of  our  proposed  methodological  approach.  Thus,  we  now  turn  to  engaging  in  a 
theoretical hypothesis derivation in order to help properly motivate the empirical demonstration 
of our proposed methodological approach 
 
A great deal of scholarship recognizes that macro-level institutional features vary across nations 
and  that  this  variation  in  the  institutional  context  will  result  in  variation  in  both  business 
strategies and organizational outcomes (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Hall and Soskice, 2001; 
Hillman and Keim, 1995; North, 1990). For instance, Hillman and Keim (1995) focus on how 
the  interface  between  government  and  business  will  be  fundamentally  affected  by  national 
institutional setting. A common generalization made by those doing research on the relevance of 
cross-national institutional variation is that the Anglo-American institutional structures share a 
number  of  commonalities  that  are  in  stark  contrast  to  the  structures  shared  by  Continental 
European nations. For instance in their study of corporate governance variation in the advanced 
capitalist  countries,  Aguilera  and  Jackson  (2003:  447)  state  that  ―in  most  comparisons Using Rival Effects  19 
researchers  contrast  two  dichotomous  models  of  Anglo-American  and  Continental  European 
corporate governance‖. Aguilera and Jackson  go on  – akin to Hall and Soskice (2001) – to 
highlight the relevance of the fact that shareholders face more powerful competing stakeholders 
in Continental Europe as compared to the Anglo-American world. Furthermore, Gugler et al. 
(2004)  show  that  variation  in  legal  structures  that  correspond  to  the  above  geographic 
distinctions appear to matter when considering business investment returns. Taking the next step, 
Haleblian et al.‘s (2009) review of the organizational literature on M&As observes that macro-
level institutional factors might also influence the nature of merger activity, yet they lament that 
little  research  has  addressed  this  particular  topic.  It  follows  then  that  merger  activity  in  the 
Anglo-American  and  Continental-European  environments  will  exhibit  differences  due  to  the 
heterogeneity in macro-level institutional factors. Accordingly, a simple hypothesis follows: 
HYPOTHESIS  The nature of merger  activity in  the Anglo-American  environment  will 




Our  proposed  schematic  of  merger  activity  is  general  in  that  it  is  conceptually  based  on 
transaction-induced profitability effects (i.e., the impact of a merger on value and profits) for 
merging and rival firms. Empirical operationalizations could accordingly use stock price data 
(both short-run and long-run event-windows) as well as accounting and survey-based data to 
capture the profitability and performance of the merger. Our own empirical demonstration will 
employ stock price data based on relatively long short-term windows. As McWilliams and Siegel 
(1997), McWilliams et al. (1999), and Haleblian et al. (2009) attest, the principal advantage of a Using Rival Effects  20 
short-term window is that stock price changes are better attributed to the event and less subject to 
confounding effects. For instance, keeping the window narrow insures against the presence of 
other major shocks and events being the true source of any abnormal return. Nevertheless, the 
advantage with longer event windows is that more information  concerning the event can be 
impounded by the financial market: e.g., whether the executives of target firms will be retained 
post-acquisition (Bergh, 2001). 
 
In our methodological context, it is important to follow the prescriptions of Oler et al. (2008) and 
expand the event-window beyond a very narrow 3-days (from 1 day before until 1 day after the 
event), as we consider both the reaction of merging firms and rival firms to an event. It stands to 
reason that it will take more time to impound the effects of a merger on the stock prices of rival 
firms, as financial markets must first ascertain the nature of the merger, then calculate the nature 
of competition and rivalry in the market, and finally factor the impact of the merger on rival 
firms. While the above suggests extending the event-window beyond one day after the event, the 
potential for information leakages also suggests extending the event-window prior to the event. 
Information leakages are particularly pertinent given the nature of our merger sample (very large 
horizontal combinations); thus, the likelihood that information leaks to the market prior to the 
merger announcement is quite high (e.g., Ellert, 1976). With the above considerations in mind, 
we employ a 56-day event window (from 50 days before until 5 days after the event) in order to 
more fully capture the impact of the merger on both merging and rival firms.
4  
 
Beyond the above intuitive rationales behind expanding the event -window, auxiliary empirical 
evidence suggests that the 56-day window yields the tightest correlation with the actual changes Using Rival Effects  21 
in  accounting-based  profits  earned  by  merging  and  rival  firms  in  the  three  to  five  years 
subsequent to the merger.
5 Thus, our 56-day event-window results appear to follow through on 
the intended aim of the event -study procedure: i.e., any event-induced changes to the future 
profit stream of firms affected by an event are captured in  changes to these firms‘ stock prices 
(see McWilliams and Siegel, 1997 for more details). And by completing this robustness check, 
we follow through on Oler et al.‘s (2008) prescription to search for additional measures – such as 
accounting-based data – which might contribute to better understanding a merger event‘s true 
impact. We should also note that auxiliary tests employing a narrow 3-day window (-1,+1) yield 
virtually identical results to the 56-day window results; though, the 3-day results do not correlate 
well with post-merger profit data. 
 
Using the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for merging firms and rival firms over a 56-day 
window, we then classify particular M&As into the four merger types illustrated in Table 2. 
Notice that we consider the abnormal returns of merging firms (acquirer plus target) in order to 
sidestep the whole issue as to which of these two firms captures the majority of the transaction 
value  (Singh  and  Montgomery,  1987;  Barney,  1988;  Sirower,  1997;  Andrade,  et  al.,  2001). 
While it is generally an important question as to whether the acquirer or target earns the majority 
of the value created by a merger (see Datta et al., 1992, King et al., 2004, and Haleblian et al., 
2009 for reviews) the focus here is simply on whether the merger actually created value and not 
on who gets that value. Accordingly, each empirical observation represents a pairing between the 
two merging firms and the relevant set of rivals for the merger transaction. We also enlarge the 
proposed taxonomy to include an extra empirical category labeled ‗no effect‘: cases where the 
CARs are not statistically different from zero (within one standard error around zero). Using Rival Effects  22 
 
In order to be concrete, we can clarify here how the proposed schematic can be grafted on to a 
sample of horizontal merger  activity  while employing the event-study  procedure in  order to 
delineate between different M&A types. Therefore, when employing an event-study procedure 
with stock price data, we can classify mergers as follows:  
  mergers that generate net-positive abnormal returns to merging firms (acquirer and target) 
and  a  net-positive  abnormal  return  to  rival  firms  can  be  considered  collusion-based 
synergistic mergers, 
  mergers that generate net-positive abnormal returns to merging firms (acquirer and target) 
and  a  net-negative  abnormal  return  to  rival  firms  can  be  considered  efficiency-based 
synergistic mergers, 
  mergers  that  generate  net-negative  abnormal  returns  to  merging  firms  (acquirer  and 
target) and a net-positive abnormal return to rival firms can be considered non-synergistic 
mergers, 
  mergers  that  generate  net-negative  abnormal  returns  to  merging  firms  (acquirer  and 




Our sample captures  large horizontal M&As that occurred within the 1990-2002 period and 
affected  European  product  markets.
  The  sample  was  drawn  from  those  merger  transactions 
automatically analyzed by the European Commission (EC) for antitrust implications.
6 The chief 
advantage to drawing our sample from the mergers analyzed by EC officials is that Commission Using Rival Effects  23 
experts  have  identified  the  relevant  competitors  (rivals)  for  every  M&A,  thus  yielding  an 
accurate  assessment  of  rival  identity.  The  expert  assessment  of  rival  identity  represents  a 
particular  strength  of  this  sample,  as  much  of  the  finance-based  literature  that  analyzes  the 
impact  of  mergers  on  rivals  simply  defines  rivals  as  those  firms  sharing  the  same  industry 
classification (e.g., Eckbo, 1983; Song and Walkling, 2000; Fee and Thomas, 2004). Yet sharing 
the same industry does not equate to actually competing against merging firms in a particular 
market; hence, the expert assessment of rival-identity allows assessing the effect of mergers on 
rivals  much  more  precisely  than  most  previous  work.  While  Shahrur  (2005)  takes  a  novel 
approach by employing input-output account data in order to identify buyer and seller firms, this 
identification of customers, suppliers, and rivals is still based on industry classifications. Thus, 
rival-firm identification represents a substantial strength to our particular data sample.
7  
 
For the purpose of illustrating the heuristic benefits of our merger schematic and testing our 
hypothesized prior, we will focus on two different sub-samples: one based on US and UK merger 
activity  (Anglo-American),  and  one  based  on  intra-European  merger  activity  that  excludes 
merger participants from the UK (Continental European). To be specific, the Anglo-American 
M&As consist of transactions where either a US or UK firm was involved in the merger as either 
an acquirer or target, while Continental-European M&As consist of transactions where both the 
acquirer and target hail from the European continent. We were able to identify and obtain usable 
data (stock price information on the relevant acquiring, target and rival firms) for 104 merger 
transactions: 104 acquirers, 104 targets, and 380 rivals for a total of 588 firm-level observations. 
These observations were then aggregated at the merger level by using the firms‘ market value as 
a weight – leaving us with 58 Anglo-American and 46 Continental-European transactions. Thus Using Rival Effects  24 
we were conscious to balance McWilliams and Siegel‘s (1997) recommendations – elimination 
of  observations  with  confounding  events,  and  ensuring  as  large  a  sample  as  possible  – 
concerning the use of the event-studies in organizational research.
  
 
One  of  the  crucial  issues  in  event  studies  is  the  determination  of  the  moment  when  the 
information about the merger hits the market (McWilliams et al., 1999). For instance, proper 
identification of pre-emptive mergers requires that financial markets not be aware that a merger 
will be taking place. If financial markets had prior information on the likelihood of a merger but 
did not know the roles – acquirer, target and rival – that different firms would take; then, the 
merger would be identified as efficiency-based since the announcement would clarify roles and 
indicate  a  relative  increase  in  the  future  profit  stream  for  merging  firms  (Fridolfsson  and 
Stennek,  2010).  Furthermore,  external  shocks  that  affect  merging  and  rival  firms  differently 
might  also  be  threats  to  identification  with  event-studies.  Yet,  the  previously  mentioned 
conformity of our results with post-merger accounting-based profitability measures and with a 
narrow 3-day window (where external shocks are less likely) provides some confidence that 
external shocks do not substantially bias our results. Yet we can do even more to ensure against 
similar identification problems by following standard practice (e.g., Banerjee and Eckard, 1998) 
and defining the merger announcement date to be the first day in which rumors about a particular 
merger appeared in the international press. Taking the first rumor as the announcement date 
reduces the likelihood that a merger is already anticipated by the financial market.
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With the above concerns in mind,  we used ‗Dow Jones Interactive‘ – a customizable business 
news  and  research  product  that  integrates  content  from  newspapers,  newswires,  journals, Using Rival Effects  25 
research reports and web sites – to identify the event date (i.e., the first rumor in the international 
press) for  each merger  in  our sample. Furthermore, the necessary stock market  data for the 
relevant  firms  were  downloaded  from  ‗Datastream‘.  In  particular,  we  collected  daily  stock 
returns (Ri,t) and market values (MVit) for all merging and rival firms, as well as information on a 
market return (Rm,t) for each firms‘ country-industry sector (where i refers to the firm, m to the 
specific sector, and t to time). 
 
Event-Study Procedure 
With the above data at hand, we follow the standard stock market event-study procedure by 
calculating the abnormal returns corresponding to a merger announcement. The abnormal return 
for firm i around the mergers‘ announcement day t (ARi,t) is defined as it it t i R R AR ˆ
,   , where 
( it R ˆ ) is the return for the scenario in which the merger would not have been announced. This 
counterfactual variable is not observable and must therefore be estimated. Hence, by using the 
market model, we first define the ‗normal return‘ for each firm as t i t m i i t i R R , , ,       , where 
firm i‘s stock return at time t ( t i R , ) is assumed to be proportional to a market return ( t m R , ) 
and t i,  is an i.i.d. normally distributed error term. Accordingly, exogenous shocks to a market 
that homogenously affect all firms in a market will be subsumed by this market index. We then 
estimate this equation over a 240-day trading period – ending 60 days prior to the announcement 
date – while using the Scholes and Williams (1977) method. After obtaining estimates for the 
model‘s parameters α and , we can build the counterfactual estimate of the stock price in the 
event where the merger would not have been announced:  t m i i it R R , ˆ ˆ ˆ     . 
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Following the literature, and to account for possible information leakages – which influence firm 
i‘s return before (or after) the merger announcement – we define the CAR to be the sum of the 
daily abnormal returns within an event-window spanning from 1 (50) days before the event to 2 










t i i AR CAR . Since our unit of observation is the merger, we 
generate an aggregated abnormal return for the combined merged entity (acquirer and target) as 
well  as  for  the  combined  rivals  for  a  given  transaction  by  respectively  taking  the  weighted 
average of the merging firms‘ and rival firms‘ CARs using their market value as a weight. Thus, 
we calculate the average CARs (ACAR) for the merging firms (M) and rival firms (R) involved 




























   
where 
f
j I  is the number of merging – or rival – firms involved in merger j. Thus, the CARs for 
merging  firms  and  rival  firms  represent  weighted  averages  of  the  composite  firms  (see 
McWilliams et al., 1999 for more description).  
 
Table 3 reports mean CARs for all relevant firm types using our 56-day event-windwo over the 
different merger samples (Continental-European, Anglo-American and All Mergers). The sample 
means broadly conform to the well-established stylized facts (e.g., Andrade et al., 2001; King et 
al., 2004) concerning merger activity: targets reap substantial gains with positive and significant 
CARs, acquirers tend to break even by indicating CARs insignificantly different from zero, and 
merging firms as a whole generate slightly positive CARs. Using Rival Effects  27 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------- 
Empirical Results 
Using our proposed schematic in conjunction with the stock-price measures obtained via the 
event-study  procedure  allows building tables  that illustrate the  merits  of our methodological 
approach to classifying mergers. Table 4 presents the merger taxonomy based on the Anglo-
American mergers. Reflecting the importance of the proposed conceptual framework, Table 4 
illustrates the non-negligible presence of all kinds of mergers in the sample: i.e., collusion-based 
synergistic (22.41% of the sample), efficiency-based synergistic (25.86% of the sample), non-
synergistic  (18.97%)  and  value-destroying  (25.86%)  all  exist.  Furthermore,  48.28%  of  the 
merging firm observations experience a significant positive CAR, whereas 48.28% experience a 
significant negative CAR. 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------- 
Moreover, we would like to compare this sample of Anglo-American merger activity with a 
sample  of  Continental-European  merger  activity  in  order  to  test  whether  the  hypothesized 
differences  manifest  and  to  illustrate  the  relevance  of  our  merger  schematic.  Thus,  table  5 
presents the merger taxonomy based on the sub-sample of Continental-European merger activity. 
Notice  that  the  Anglo-American  and  Continental-European  sub-samples  yield  very  similar 
results with regard to how often merging firms‘ experience a significant positive CAR: 48.28% 
for the Anglo-American sample, and 50% for the Continental-European sample. If we were to Using Rival Effects  28 
have  no  information  on  rival  effects  –  akin  to  the  traditional  approach  in  the  strategic 
management literature – then the evidence would suggest that the M&As in these two samples 
are generally identical in terms of synergistic tendencies; i.e., Anglo-American and Continental-
European M&As appear to be equally synergistic. Yet factoring the impact of these mergers on 
rival firms (i.e., employing our proposed schematic) tells us quite a bit more. Collusion-based 
synergistic mergers represent 30.43% of the Continental-European sample, but only 22.41% of 
the Anglo-American sample; further, efficiency-based synergistic mergers represent 17.39% of 
the  Continental-European  sample,  and  25.86%  of  the  Anglo-American  sample.  In  short, 
efficiency-based synergistic mergers are relatively more prevalent in Anglo-American merger 
activity; and, collusion-based synergistic mergers are relatively more prevalent in Continental-
European merger activity; though, it should be noted that these differences are only statistically 
significant at a tolerant 20% and 15% level respectively.
9 Accordingly, the synergistic Anglo-
American  mergers  tend  to  be  characterized  less  by  collusive  synergies  and  more  by  the 
attainment of efficiency-based synergies. Hence, Anglo-American mergers appear to involve the 
optimal redeployment of resources between merging firms that actually leads to the creation of a 
competitive advantage vis-à-vis rivals, whereas the Continental -European mergers appear to 
simply require the reaping of benefits from the reduction of competition in a market. 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------- 
Comparing  the  Anglo -American  and  Continental -European  sam ples  for  the  non -
synergistic/value-destroying  distinction  proves to be  less  illustrative,  as  the differences  are 
neither economically nor statistically significant. We see that non-synergistic mergers – where Using Rival Effects  29 
the  M&A  decreases  the  performance  of  merging  firms  and  actually  enhances  rival  firm 
performance – represent 19.57% of Continental-European merger activity and 18.97% of Anglo-
American  merger  activity.  Furthermore,  value-destroying  mergers  represent  28.26%  of 
Continental-European and 25.86% of Anglo-American merger activity. Taking a closer look at 
the data to consider which M&A events actually indicate smaller losses for merging firms as 
compared to rival firms (i.e., truly pre-emptive mergers where the managers of merging firms 
value shareholders and mitigate profit losses), we see that five of the Anglo-American mergers 
and  five  of  the  Continental-European  mergers  were  pre-emptive.  In  sum,  no  substantial 
difference  in  the  tendency  to  undertake  value-destroying  and  non-synergistic  mergers  is 
indicated. 
 
In  sum,  the  results  from  the  empirical  demonstration  of  our  proposed  schematic  tentatively 
suggest  that  Anglo-American  mergers  are  more  efficiency-based  than  those  in  Continental 
Europe.  While  Anglo-American  and  Continental-European  merger  activity  are  equally 
synergistic in terms of merging firms‘ profitability (i.e., around 48-50% of the mergers in both 
samples  indicate  significantly  positive  abnormal  returns),  the  synergistic  Anglo-American 
mergers are largely characterized by the attainment of efficiency-based synergies as compared to 
the Continental-European mergers which are characterized more by the attainment of collusive 
synergies.  Accordingly,  the  empirical  results  yield  some  support  for  the  hypothesis  that  the 
nature of merger activity is different when comparing the merger transactions taking place in the 
Anglo-American world with those in Continental-Europe. It is imperative to underscore that such 
distinctions  in  the  two  sub-samples  of  merger  activity  would  be  impossible  to  detect  when 
employing the traditional approach of strictly focusing on the profitability of merging firms (e.g., Using Rival Effects  30 
acquirer  and  target).  Only  by  employing  our  proposed  schematic  (where  the  researcher 
simultaneously considers merging firm and rival firm effects) can such distinctions be made.  
 
Implications 
We  have  begun  here  to  address  Chatterjee‘s  (1986)  call  for  a  more  rigorous  conceptual 
framework on merger activity that embraces the full effects of merger events: i.e., the impact on 
both merging and non-merging rival firms. Moreover, the different competitive effects of M&As 
on merging and rival firms drives the identification of the different merger types in our proposed 
schematic. If one were to assume that merger motives align with merger outcomes, then rival 
effects also help us differentiate between mergers where the motive is generally softer rivalry in 
a market (i.e., collusion-based synergistic mergers) and mergers where the motive is generally 
competitive in nature (i.e., efficiency-based synergistic mergers). In addition, rival effects help 
us differentiate between mergers where the motive is often hubris or empire-building in nature 
(i.e., non-synergistic and value-destroying mergers) and mergers where the motive tends to be 
rational and shareholder-valuing (i.e., pre-emptive mergers). Without considering rival effects, 
we  simply  could  not  make  these  distinctions.  The  efficacy  of  these  distinctions  underscores 
Oxley et al.‘s (2009: 1322) point that ―examining the effect of one firm‘s action on the abnormal 
returns earned by its rivals … is quite novel in strategy research and … can be usefully applied‖. 
 
The point regarding the importance of rival effects in helping better illuminate the nature of 
merger activity can be borne out further. As already noted, focusing strictly on merging firm 
performance  does  not  allow  teasing  apart  collusion-based  from  efficiency-based  synergistic 
mergers:  both  types  positively  impact  merging  firms,  but  only  efficiency-based  mergers Using Rival Effects  31 
negatively impact rival firms. Consider, for instance, how the managerial challenges involved 
with these two types of mergers are quite different: collusive mergers simply require the killing 
off of a competitor and the subsequent reaping of gains from reduced rivalry, while efficiency-
based  mergers  require  sophisticated  integration  of  resource  bundles  a  la  Barney  (1986)  and 
Capron (1999)—integration so successful that rival firms find themselves at a disadvantage with 
regard to the merged entity. For example, our empirical demonstration tentatively indicates that 
Anglo-American  M&As  are  more  likely  to  establish  a  competitive  advantage  than  are 
Continental-European M&As. Accordingly, by defining merger types in this fashion we gain 
more insight into the potential managerial challenges involved with specific transactions. 
 
Furthermore,  value-decreasing  transactions  that  reduce  merging  firms‘  profitability  and 
performance are often considered failures on the part of management due to empire-building, 
managerial-hubris or information-processing problems (Lubatkin, 1983). Hence, mergers that 
negatively  affect  merging  firms  have  traditionally  been  lumped  into  the  value-decreasing 
category  and  considered  the  result  of  managerial  failure.  Yet  pre-emptive  mergers  (a  sub-
category  within  value-destroying  mergers)  are  fundamentally  different  mergers.  Pre-emptive 
mergers actually involve shareholder valuing management, but in this case management must 
engage in strategic actions (i.e., a merger) that decrease performance and profitability to protect 
shareholders from what would be a greater loss if the firm were left outside of merger activity. 
Thus, considering rival effects allows identification of pre-emptive mergers and differentiation 
from other value-decreasing merger types with seemingly different managerial challenges. 
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Beyond the implications outlined above (indications regarding managerial motives; insight into 
managerial challenges involved with mergers; identification of value-decreasing mergers that do 
not represent managerial failure), the ultimate test of our methodological approach is whether it 
becomes broadly-useful to future researchers. While we anticipate a number of potential avenues 
where our merger taxonomy may be usefully applied, the ability to more finely delineate the 
nature of merger activity would seemingly be of particular interest to scholarly work in three 
general areas: 1) an improved measurement construct to capture M&A outcomes as compared to 
the  previous  focus  on  merging  firms‘  profitability;  2)  a  useful  moderator  construct  for  sub-
sampling that might lead to more consistent results concerning the drivers of M&A performance; 
3) further comparisons of M&A activity across different merger samples. 
 
First, we think of our methodological approach as a means to derive a finer and more nuanced 
―dependent  variable‖  as  compared  to  what  has  traditionally  been  employed  in  the  strategy 
literature.  While  the  strategy  literature  has  customarily  employed  the  abnormal  returns  of 
merging firms as the dependent construct and then considered the various drivers of merger 
value, the implicit argument here is that such efforts will involve spurious causal inferences in 
light of the measurement error involved with strictly considering the performance of merging 
firms. Hence, we expect that our merger schematic can replace the propensity in the strategy 
literature to simply consider the factors that drive merger profitability. Thus instead of focusing 
simply on the drivers of merging firms‘ value and profits, future empirical scholarship with 
theoretically generated hypotheses could consider the factors determining the different merger 
types.  Such  research  would  necessarily  involve  the  coupling  of  our  proposed  approach  to 
classifying merger activity along with multinomial logit analysis (e.g., Long, 1987) in order to Using Rival Effects  33 
properly  deal  with  the  categorical  nature  of  the  dependent  variable.  In  sum,  only  by  better 
measuring the nature of merger activity (i.e., considering the impact of the merger on rival firms 
as  well  as  merging  firms)  can  researchers  truly  converge  on  the  actual  drivers  of  M&A 
performance and outcomes.  
 
Second,  the  different  merger  types  embedded  in  our  merger  taxonomy  may  be  useful  as 
moderator constructs that allow enhanced sub-sampling and interaction analysis. Consider, for 
instance, the King et  al. (2004) study  which highlights  the empirical  literature‘s inability to 
consistently  and  repeatedly  converge  upon  the  drivers  of  M&A  performance.  The  authors 
accordingly conclude that a missing moderator of merger performance exists, as ―researchers 
simply may not be looking at the ‗right‘ set of variables as predictors‖ (King et al., 2004: 197). 
Our  proposed  schematic  might  proffer  a  solution  to  this  puzzle,  as  it  could  explain  the 
inconsistency  in  the  empirical  literature:  i.e.,  identify  one  of  those  missing  moderators.  In 
particular,  the  predictors  of  M&A  success  (relatedness,  experience,  integration,  etc.)  may 
fundamentally differ for different merger types, thus explaining the prevailing inconsistency in 
empirical  results  concerning M&A performance drivers.  For instance, acquisition experience 
could be fundamental for efficiency-based mergers that seek to re-deploy resources in an optimal 
manner, but acquisition experience may be ineffectual for collusive mergers that simply seek the 
reduction of competition in a market. Accordingly, using our merger taxonomy to sub-sample – 
and then testing which factors drive performance for a particular merger type – may lead to more 
consistent findings than has been yielded by the pre-existing literature. Thus, our delineation of 
merger type via a transaction‘s impact on both merging and rival firms may help explain mixed 
findings in the empirical literature concerning merger activity. Using Rival Effects  34 
 
Third, the empirical demonstration of our methodological approach gave a simple example of 
how researchers could start to use our taxonomy in a deeper analysis of M&A activity. While our 
approach should certainly be built upon and integrated with theoretical work to derive testable 
hypotheses concerning the nature of merger activity, one can nevertheless imagine additional 
comparisons – implemented in a similar manner – to be of interest to M&A activity scholarship; 
e.g., differences between domestic and cross-border mergers (Gugler et al., 2003), manufacturing 
and  service  industry  mergers  (Clougherty  and  Duso,  2010),  and  all-cash  and  tender-offer 
differences (Sirower, 1997). Furthermore, similar comparisons of M&A activity across other 
geographic regions might be of interest to corporate governance (e.g., Aguilera and Jackson, 
2003; Gugler et al., 2004) and institutionalist scholars (e.g., Hall and Soskice, 2001), as the 
existence of substantially different merger types in different regions would support the merits of 
focusing  on  the  relevance  of  cross-national  heterogeneity  in  institutional  frameworks.  For 
instance, the evident differences in our two sub-samples of merger activity potentially bear out 
Haleblian et al.‘s (2009) observation that macro-level factors – like national culture and legalistic 
traditions – may influence the nature of merger activity.  
 
Conclusion 
Motivated  by  the  inability  in  the  strategy  literature  to  differentiate  between  collusive  and 
efficiency-based synergies, we build a theoretically-based methodological approach that yields 
more information on merger type. The proposed schematic departs from the customary approach 
in the empirical literature to simply focus on how M&As impact merging firms (i.e., the acquirer 
and target) by also considering how mergers impact rival firms. In particular, by analyzing rival Using Rival Effects  35 
firm  effects  –  in  combination  with  the  traditional  focus  on  merging  firm  effects  –  we  can 
differentiate between collusion-based and efficiency-based synergistic mergers (the two value-
increasing M&A types  for merging firms) and  between non-synergistic and value-destroying 
mergers (the two main value-decreasing M&A types for merging firms). Simply put, the reaction 
of  rival  firms  to  merger  events  yields  critical  information  on  the  nature  of  the  proposed 
transaction. We empirically demonstrate the relevance of the proposed schematic on merger 
samples drawn from the US and UK (Anglo-American) and the European continent, and show 
that  differences  in  Continental-European  and  Anglo-American  merger  activity  only  become 
manifest once rival effects are considered. Thus, we urge strategic management scholarship to 
begin to heed Chatterjee‘s (1986, 1992) early call to consider rival effects, as the impact of a 
merger on rival firms – in combination with the impact on merging firms – provides salient 
information regarding the true nature of the transaction. Using Rival Effects  36 
Notes 
                                                 
1 McGahan and Silverman‘s (2006) study on how granted-patents impact rivals, and Clougherty 
and  Duso‘s  (2009)  contention  that  rival  firms  generally  gain  from  mergers  represent  two 
exceptions to this point. Further, Fosfuri and Giarratana (2009) observe that the same neglect for 
rival-effects is present in the marketing literature. 
2 When it comes to operationalizing pre -emptive mergers with event-studies (as we will do), 
financial markets should have no a priori knowledge that a merger is imminent if the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) is to accurately identify pre-emptive mergers. If the market knew that a 
merger was imminent but did not know the various roles (acquirer, target, and rival) that firms 
would take, then merging firms‘ CAR would be positive, and measurement error would result 
with pre-emptive mergers manifesting as efficiency-based mergers (Fridolfsson and Stennek, 
2010).  In  order  to  mitigate  this  risk,  we  use  the  first  rumor  of  a  potential  merger  as  the 
announcement date instead of the official announcement date. Please see the last two paragraphs 
in the ‗Data‘ sub-section – and the attendant endnote 8 – for more details on this point. 
3 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NCR_Corporation for this quote – accessed on May 25, 2011. 
4 Note that, while it is absolutely true that broader windows might enhance the risk that other 
events are driving the results, we are very careful in excluding those firms which have been 
involved in simultaneous events. In other words, we cleaned the data  of any firms experiencing 
multiple  merger  events  (as  acquirer,  target  or  rival)  around  the  same  period —i.e.,  those 
observations were dropped. Moreover, our ―long event window‖ is actually what Oler et al. 
(2008) term as a ―medium event window‖. Indeed, we do not look at several years after the 
event, which would excessively enhance the risk noted above. Accordingly, our long window is 
a bit different than Oler et al. in that it is particularly long with regards to the days preceding the 
event rather than the days and weeks following the merger event. Finally, the mergers in our 
sample were very large mergers and, hence, major events. Therefore, the likelihood that other – 
more minor – events might have more significantly affected firms‘ stock prices seems to be low. 
5 We were able to collect balance sheet data from Standard & Poor‘s ‗Global Vantage‘ database 
for a sub-sample of our data. This allowed creating a post-merger profitability measure for both 
merging and rival firms. In particular, the measure takes the reported profit levels over total asset Using Rival Effects  37 
                                                                                                                                                               
levels  for  merging  and  rival  firms,  and  then  compares  that  measure  with  a  counterfactual 
measure of this variable (i.e., what that measure should be in the absence of the merger event). 
We define the counterfactual in a manner akin to Duso, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2010) where they 
use the development of profits over total assets for the median firm (in terms of profitability) in 
the  same  3-digit  SIC  industry  that  merging  and  rival  firms  operate.  We  then  calculate  the 
development of profits from three to five years after the merger in order to control for transitory 
post-acquisition integration challenges (Jennings et al., 2005; Clougherty & Moliterno, 2010). 
When estimating a table of correlation coefficients, we find that the abnormal returns calculated 
using  a  longer  (-50,+5)  window  indicate  a  much  tighter  –  and  statistically  significant  – 
relationship with post-merger profitability than does a shorter 3-day window. Thus, the longer 
short-term  window  appears to  indicate  greater construct  validity,  as  it converges  on another 
operationalization (accounting-based profit effects) that theory suggests it should be similar with. 
6 EU merger regulations mandate notification when the combined aggregate worldwide turnover 
of merging firms exceeds  €5  billion  or  when  the  combined  aggregate  EU-wide  turnover  of 
merging  firms  exceeds  €250  million.
  Therefore,  these  M&As  have  undergone  a  mandatory 
investigation  by  the  EC—an  investigation  automatically  triggered  because  the  merger  size 
exceeded notification thresholds. Thus by not picking up the small mergers that do not require 
notification, the sample is characterized by relatively large horizontal mergers. However, the 
robustness  of  the  results  to  various  sub-samples  based  on  different  antitrust-scrutiny  levels 
suggests  that  the  sample  is  not  defined  by  anti-competitive  mergers  where  collusion-based 
motivations would consistently prevail. Furthermore, EC antitrust authorities do not appear to be 
using stock-price reactions as a benchmark to detect anti-competitive mergers, as collusion-based 
synergistic mergers (where antitrust should be most concerned) do not elicit significantly more 
scrutiny than other types of mergers. Lubatkin et al. (1997) also find that changes in antitrust 
scrutiny levels do not change the nature of US merger activity as measured by CARs. Thus, it is 
unlikely that merging firms manipulate stock prices in order to ensure antitrust clearance. 
7 The first step in building the sample involved selecting all mergers which went through an in-
depth (phase II) antitrust investigation from the beginning of 1990 until December 2001 —
leaving us with a total of 90 phase II cases. In order to obtain a representative sample and avoid 
problems  of endogenous sample selection, a sub-sample of 110 merger cases  was  randomly Using Rival Effects  38 
                                                                                                                                                               
selected—cases which were resolved in the preliminary (phase I) investigation phase. For all of 
the above mergers (200 in total), we collected information on the merging firms (such as name, 
location, world-wide and EU-wide turnover), the name of all reported competitors, the policy 
decision  (article,  commitments/obligations/undertakings,  notification  and  decision  date),  the 
geographic market of reference, and the product market of reference according to the NACE 
codes.  Some  cases  had  to  be  dismissed  because  we  were  not  able  to  obtain  stock  market 
information for the merging firms and/or competitors. From these transactions, we were able to 
identify and obtain the relevant usable data for 104 acquirers, 104 targets, and 380 rivals for a 
total of 588 firm-level observations around merger events. See Duso, Neven and Röller (2007), 
Clougherty and Duso (2009), and Duso et al. (2010) for examples of empirical studies that draw 
a merger sample from the EC for similar benefits. 
8 To ensure the accuracy of these dates, we obtained the ‗official‘ announcement dates from 
Thomson Reuters SDC database for a large sub-sample of our mergers: with the first-rumors 
occurring 35-days prior to the ‗official‘ announcement dates on average. Furthermore, if one was 
concerned that rumor-dates overlapped with shock-dates (shocks which induced the mergers), 
then the ‗official‘ dates will be further removed from the shock and thus be less subject to shock-
induced bias. The downside of these official dates is that little additional information may be 
yielded to financial markets, thus the abnormal returns might be minimal. We re-estimated our 
CARs using these ‗official‘ announcement dates and found significant correspondence with the 
CARs we employ with our reported results (a correlation of 0.63 for merging firms, and 0.54 for 
rival  firms).  In  addition,  McGahan  and  Porter‘s  (1999)  finding  that  external  shocks  tend  to 
distribute evenly across an industry also suggests that such shocks do not represent a major threat 
to our event-study analysis. With the above points in mind, we do have some confidence that 
external shocks are not driving the CARs we elicit with our favored 56-day event-window.  
9 The lack of statistical significance is in part due to the limited sample size on which we run our 
tests for differences in means, and is also due in part to the nature of the merger taxonomy as 
differences between samples will not necessarily be huge. When we artificially expand the 
sample size by making each rival firm reaction to a merger a unit of observation (instead of 
averaging the weighted CARs for all rival firms), we elicit some statistically -different means 
when comparing the Anglo-American and Continental-European samples. Using Rival Effects  39 
Appendix 
 
Sample of Merger Activity sorted by Classification of Merger Type 
 
Acquirer  Target  Sample  Year 
Collusion-Based Synergistic Mergers 
Cyanamid  Shell  Anglo  1993 
Crown Cork & Seal   Carnaudmetalbox Sa  Anglo  1995 
Coca-Cola Enterprises  Cadbury Schweppes  Anglo  1996 
Guinness  Grand Metropolitan  Anglo  1997 
Worldcom  MCI  Anglo  1997 
Dow Jones  General Electric  Anglo  1997 
Commercial Union Plc  General Accident Plc  Anglo  1997 
Ingram  Tech Data  Anglo  1998 
Bp Amoco Plc.  Atlantic Richfield   Anglo  1999 
Dow Chemical  Union Carbide  Anglo  1999 
Unilever PLC  Bestfood  Anglo  2000 
United Airlines  US Airways Group Inc.  Anglo  2000 
H.J. Heinz Company  CSM NV  Anglo  2001 
Fiat  Alcatel  Cont.  1990 
Viag  Continental Can  Cont.  1991 
Nestle'  Eaux Vittel  Cont.  1992 
Mannesmann  Hoesch  Cont.  1992 
Schneider Electric S.A.  AEG A.G.  Cont.  1994 
Tractebel  Synatom  Cont.  1994 
Man  Ingersoll Rand  Cont.  1994 
Thyssen Stahl  Acciai Speciali Asti  Cont.  1994 
Saint Gobain  Hoechst Wacker  Cont.  1996 
Total Fina  Elf Aquitaine  Cont.  1999 
Framatome  Siemens  Cont.  2000 
Metsä-Serla Corporation  Modo  Cont.  2000 
Stinnes AG (E.ON AG)  Holland Chemical  Cont.  2000 
Fabricom  GTI  Cont.  2001 
Efficiency-Based Synergistic Mergers 
Digital Equipment Int.  Mannesmann  Anglo  1991 
Du Pont  Imperial Chemical Ind.  Anglo  1992 
Asea Brown Boveri  Trafalgar Hse  Anglo  1992 
Fletcher Challenge  Methanex  Anglo  1993 
British Telecom  MCI (Ii)  Anglo  1997 
Boeing  McDonnell Douglas  Anglo  1997 
Exxon Corporation  Mobil Corporation  Anglo  1999 
Astra  Zeneca  Anglo  1999 
ACCOR  S.A.  The BLACKSTONE   Anglo  1999 
Alcan Aluminium Lcd.  Alusuisse Lonza  Anglo  1999 
Emc  Data General  Anglo  1999 
Boeing  Hughes Electronics  Anglo  1999 
Ashland  Superfos  Anglo  1999 Using Rival Effects  40 
Acquirer  Target  Sample  Year 
Efficiency-Based Synergistic Mergers 
Cendant Corporation  Galileo International  Anglo  2001 
Flextronics International  Xerox Corporation  Anglo  2001 
Alcatel Cable S.A.  Aeg Kabel  Cont.  1991 
Orkla As  Volvo  Cont.  1995 
Fortis  Abn-Amro Bank  Cont.  1997 
Roche  Boehringer Mannheim  Cont.  1997 
Linde AG  AGA AB  Cont.  1999 
Ab Volvo  Scania Ab  Cont.  1999 
Vivendi S.A.  Canal+ S.A.  Cont.  2000 
UPM-Kymmene  Haindl  Cont.  2001 
Non-Synergistic Mergers 
Ingersoll Rand Co.  Dresser Inc.  Anglo  1991 
Uap  Transatlantic HDG.  Anglo  1991 
Coca Cola  Carslberg A/S  Anglo  1996 
ATT  TCI  Anglo  1998 
Getronics N.V.  Wang Laboratories  Anglo  1999 
Du Pont   Hoechst  Anglo  1999 
AOL  Time Warner  Anglo  1999 
Ford Motor Company  Autonova AB  Anglo  2000 
General Electric Corp.  Honeywell  Anglo  2000 
Sara Lee  Courtaulds Textiles   Anglo  2000 
Cadbury  Schweppes  Pernod  Anglo  2001 
Ericsson  Ascom  Cont.  1992 
CCF  BHF  Cont.  1994 
Siemens  Italtel  Cont.  1994 
Ciba-Geigy  Sandoz  Cont.  1996 
ALSTOM  ABB  Cont.  1999 
SCA Mölnlycke Holding  Metsä Tissue Corp.  Cont.  2000 
Matra Marconi Space  Astrium  Cont.  1999 
Svedala Industri AB  Metso Corporation  Cont.  2000 
Deutsche Shell GmbH  RWE AG  Cont.  2001 
Value-Destroying Mergers 
ATT  Ncr Corporation  Anglo  1990 
Digital Equipment Corp.  Philips Electronics  Anglo  1991 
Anglo American Corp.  Lonmin  Anglo  1996 
General Electric  Finmeccanica  Anglo  1998 
ATT  MediaOne Group  Anglo  1999 
ACCOR  S.A.  The BLACKSTONE  Anglo  1999 
Alcoa Inc.  Reynolds Metals  Anglo  1999 
MCI WorldCom  Sprint  Anglo  1999 
GE Capital Corporation  Heller Financial, Inc  Anglo  2001 
General Electric Company  Unison Industries Inc.  Anglo  2002 
Accor  Wagons-Lits  Cont.  1991 
Shell  Montedison  Cont.  1993 Using Rival Effects  41 
Acquirer  Target  Sample  Year 
Value-Destroying Mergers 
Knp  Buehrmann Tetterode  Cont.  1993 
Union Carbide  Enichem S.P.A.  Cont.  1995 
Siemens  Lagardere  Cont.  1996 
Siemens  Elektrowatt  Cont.  1997 
De Beers  LVMH  Cont.  2001 
UPM-Kymmene  Haindl  Cont.  2001 
Value-Destroying (Pre-Emptive sub-category) Mergers 
Commercial Union  Suez  Anglo  1994 
Gencor  Lonmin  Anglo  1995 
Kimberly-Clark  Scott Paper  Anglo  1995 
Thyssen Krupp Stahl  Itw Signode  Anglo  1997 
AstraZeneca Plc.  Novartis AG  Anglo  1999 
Mannesmann  Vlourec  Dalmine  Cont.  1993 
Cardo  Thyssen  Cont.  1996 
Schneider  Legrand  Cont.  2000 
Koninklijke KPN N.V.  E-Plus  Cont.  2002 
Vendex KBB Nederland  Brico Belgium S.A.  Cont.  2002 
No-Effect Mergers 
Ingersoll Rand Co.  Dresser Inc.  Anglo  1991 
Chs Electronics Inc.  Metro  Anglo  1998 
General Electric Company  Unison Industries Inc.  Anglo  2002 
EnerSys  Energy Storage  Anglo  2002 
Bertelsmann  Taurus Entertainment   Cont.  1997 
Deutsche Telekom  Bertelsmann  Cont.  1997 
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Table 3 
The Means for the Estimated CARs 
 
Sample 
Continental-European  Anglo-American  All 
Mergers  Mergers  Mergers 
(Obs. 46)  (Obs. 58)  (Obs. 104) 
Event Window 
56-day  56-day  56-day 
(-50,+5)  (-50,+5)  (-50,+5) 
Acquirer 
-0.0008  0.0009  0.0002 
(0.0202)  (0.0172)  (0.0131) 
Target 
0.0596  0.0983  0.0814 
(0.0275)  (0.0245)  (0.0182) 
Merging Firms  0.0045  0.0227  0.0108 
(weighted)  (0.0181)  (0.0184)  (0.0130) 
Rival Firms  0.0013  0.0039  0.0016 
(weighted)  (0.0125)  (0.0116)  (0.0084) 
 
 
Notes: The mean value of the average estimated CAR employing the 56-day window (50,5) is reported in 
the first line, and standard errors are reported on the second line in parentheses. For merging firms and rival 
firms, the individual CARs are weighted with the respective market value.  
 
















































Total  28 (48.28%)  2 (3.45%)  28 (48.28%)  58 (100%) 
Notes: We measure profitability by means of the 56-day CAR window. The first number in each cell 
reflects how many such merger-type observations are in the sample, while the second number – in 
parentheses – refers to the percentage of all observations the cell represents. 
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Table 5 











































Total  23 (50.00%)  0 (0.00%)  23 (50.00%)  46 (100%) 
Notes: We measure profitability by means of the 56-day CAR window. The first number in each cell 
reflects how many such merger-type observations are in the sample, while the second number – in 
parentheses – refers to the percentage of all observations the cell represents. 
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